Here you can find more information on my research.
Repression by collective responsibility (JMP)
I formalize a key trade-off in collective punishment: while punishing people for others' actions weakens the direct deterrent effect of the sanction, it motivates them to police one another.
I ask under what conditions the ability to manipulate elections increases incumbents' effort. I show that if effort and manipulation are publicly observed, manipulation can induce more effort and thus yield genuinely more popular incumbents.
Punishing the innocent to signal cruelty
I show that cruel rulers (those who can impose harsher punishments on people at lower costs to themselves) can credibly set themselves apart, and maximize obedience, by punishing innocents.
Collective punishments and information extraction
Collective punishment can serve as an information-extraction device. By threatening to punish all when no one reports, a ruler creates incentives for witnesses to talk to their peers, making it more likely that someone will report to the ruler.
On the general (im)possibility of preference aggregation
Scholars have proposed "meta-theorems" of preference aggregation to unify impossibility results such as Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. I show these unifications follow from the classics: a “meta-meta-theorem” that itself derives from Arrow.